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Executive Summary 
1. A recent unpublished manuscript whose conclusions were widely circulated in the electronic 
media (Zinman, 2009) claimed that Oregon’s 2007 payday loan (PL) rate-limiting 
regulations (hereafter, “Cap”) have hurt borrowers.  
2. The report’s main conclusion, phrased in cause-and-effect language in its abstract - 
“…restricting access caused deterioration in the overall financial condition of the Oregon 
households…” – relies on a single, small-sample survey funded by the payday-lending 
industry (PLI). The survey is fraught with methodological flaws.  
3. Moreover, survey results do not support the claim that Oregon borrowers fared worse than 
Washington borrowers, on any variable that can be plausibly attributed to the Cap.  
4. In fact, Oregon respondents fared better than Washington respondents on two key variables: 
on-time bill payment rate and avoiding phone-line disconnects. On all other relevant 
variables they fared similarly to Washington respondents. In short, the report’s claim is 
baseless.   
5. There were a few mild observed differences on general economic variables (e.g., 
respondents’ overall future financial outlook). These are far more likely related to the 
current recession hitting Oregon earlier and harder than Washington, than to the Oregon PL 
Cap. The report altogether ignores the crisis and its effect on study results, and also 
repeatedly uses questionable arithmetic to make results appear worse for Oregon.  
6. As to certain post-Cap events in Oregon – namely, the PLI’s swift and massive exodus from 
the state and the subsequent reduction in PL activity – the report prefers to repeat the PLI’s 
explanations of these events word-for-word. There is no exploration of alternative causal 
chains – a half-dozen of which are suggested below. This type of exploration is part and 
parcel of academic research. In any case, as stated above, the report fails to prove that these 
events have been detrimental to Oregon borrowers.  
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1. Introduction 
Within a decade and a half, payday-loan (PL) stores in most US states have mushroomed from 
almost nonexistent and downright illegal, to “more [common]… than McDonald’s and Starbucks 
combined” (Zinman, 2009).1 For much of that time, a political battle has been raging between 
lenders and various consumer and social-justice groups who have opposed this growth. Until a 
few years ago lenders had held the upper hand, but more recently the tide has been turning, 
nationwide and state by state. As Zinman (2009) mentions, even President Obama has openly 
expressed his dim view of the PL phenomenon and its impact upon the poor.2  
In July 2007, the state of Oregon lowered its PL interest-rate cap from an APR of 528% to 156%, 
extended the minimum loan duration from 14 to 31 days, and added other consumer-protection 
measures (hereafter this change, following legislation passed in 2006, will be called “the Cap”, 
using Zinman’s terminology). The Cap was followed by an immediate and massive exodus from 
the state by the payday-lender industry (PLI): over the year 2007 more than two-thirds of 
Oregon’s PL shops had shut down (Graves, 2008).   
The report, analyzing a survey of Oregon and Washington PL borrowers immediately before the 
Cap’s enactment (June-July 2007), and a follow-up with some of the same respondents five 
months later in November-December 2007, claims to have found a causal connection between 
the Cap and Oregonians’ financial well-being. This connection is summarized succinctly in the 
abstract, as quoted above in my Executive Summary (“…restricting access caused deterioration 
in the overall financial condition of the Oregon households…”), and is spelled out in more detail 
later on:  
“The five-month results above suggest that the Oregon Cap reduced the supply of 
credit for payday borrowers, and that the financial condition of borrowers (as 
measured by employment status and subjective assessments) suffered as a result.” 
(Zinman, 2009, p. 13) 
The suggested causal chain of events is schematically drawn in Fig. 1. Declaring a causal 
connection based on statistical analysis is a bold step – especially a multi-stage connection 
like that depicted in Fig. 1. The proper method to find such a connection is a randomized 
                                                 
1
 My first critique of this study referred to the original October 2008 version. Since then, two updated versions were 
posted by Dr. Zinman. The first update (12/08) was a very minor change. The more recent version (3/09) had more 
substantial changes to the style and organization, but the general analysis, discussion and message have remained 
almost identical. Some important interim data were dropped from the March 2009 version, and I will refer to these 
data later on. However, in general the critique addresses the latest version, as is customary. 
2
 I will refrain from explaining here what PLs are. The nature of these loans and their benefit or damage to society 
are highly interesting to discuss at this unique point in American history, but the discussion is mostly tangential to 
the article’s main focus and is therefore omitted here (there will be a brief discussion PL profitability in Section 3). 
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controlled experiment – and a multi-stage connection probably requires several experiments. By 
contrast, the results of field surveys and observational studies performed on society are usually 
framed in terms of associations and not in cause-and-effect language. This is not a mere 
formality: in a well-run controlled experiment we can eliminate or neutralize the impact of all 
possible causes except for the examined one. In other study types – including surveys and 
observational studies – such isolation of the effect of interest is typically not feasible. We cannot 
eliminate the possibility that other factors have caused the observed signals; this is known as 
confounding (Friedman et al., 2007, Ch. 1-2).  
Under certain conditions it may be acceptable to reach a level of confidence that allows one to 
declare causality without a controlled experiment. However, typically the evidence needs to be 
overwhelmingly strong and broad, coming from many different independent studies. The 
Surgeon General committee examined 7,000 scientific articles before concluding that smoking 
causes lung cancer without the “smoking gun” of a randomized experiment (Surgeon General, 
1964). 
Less PL-type 
Borrowing in 
Oregon
Oregon 
Borrowers 
are Worse 
Off
Oregon Lowers 
PL Interest Cap
 
Figure 1: The main causal chain of events that, according to Zinman (2009), connects the Cap to Oregon 
borrowers being worse off. More detail will be shown in Fig. 4 (Section 3).  
The study of the impact of a policy change, or of any other sudden, drastic event affecting 
society, is known as “quasi-experimental analysis” (Campbell and Ross, 1968). This type of 
study examines “before vs. after” differences, and whether they should be attributed to the policy 
change. One way to partially disentangle the change’s effect from background historical trends, 
is to look at similar neighboring regions (localities, states, nations) in which the change did not 
take place. In the survey reported by Zinman (2009), the state of Washington, which is generally 
considered to most resemble Oregon in its geography, society and economy, was chosen. The 
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study can thus be roughly described as a “case-control quasi-experiment”, with Oregon being the 
“quasi-case”, Washington the “quasi-control”, and the Cap being the “quasi-treatment”.  
This could be a plausible analysis frame. Nevertheless, Washington is not Oregon, and the 
survey in question is not a controlled experiment. It is impossible to remove all confounding 
factors that make Washington’s society and economy different from Oregon. The burden of 
examining whether – for a particular study – the two are similar enough for one of them to act as 
a reasonable “quasi-control” to the other, lies upon the researchers and not the audience. In any 
case, the language used to describe any results from such a study should be much more careful 
and nuanced than the statements in Zinman (2009).  
Besides using careful language, a responsible analysis of uncontrolled surveys and observational 
studies must include some meaningful discussion of other potential causes for any observed 
effects (again I refer the reader to Ch. 1, 2 and 19 of the Friedman et al., 2007 basic-statistics 
textbook). This discussion is largely absent from the report, which frames the survey as if it were 
a randomized experiment.  
With this key point made, it is still worthwhile to inspect whether the report’s main claim still 
stands, albeit on a weaker footing. The first stage of the causal chain in Fig. 1 – i.e., the 
association between the Cap and decreased PL use in Oregon - does not seem to be in much 
doubt, and in fact many of the Cap’s proponents may see it as a favorable outcome.3 The more 
critical question, therefore, is whether the Cap, directly or via decreased PL use, is indeed clearly 
associated with deterioration in the financial condition of Oregon’s pre-Cap PL borrower 
population. This will be dealt with immediately below in Section 2, which is the longest section 
of this critique. Section 3 examines the public events surrounding the PLI’s exit, and their 
interpretation in Zinman (2009). The critique ends in Section 4, with conclusions and some 
recommendations.  
 
                                                 
3
 That being said, whether the causal connection for the post-Cap reduction in PL activity is as simple as the author 
would have us believe is an open question, which will be dealt with later in Section 3. 
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2. Are Oregonians Worse Off? 
2.1 The Sample 
The 2008 election season has once again demonstrated the potential of sample surveys. When 
survey questions are simple and clear-cut, and when the sample is representative, a survey of 
several hundred citizens can provide a general indication of where the entire public stands. 
However, if the sample is not representative, all bets are off and the survey’s results may be 
completely meaningless or even misleading (Friedman et al., 2007, Ch. 19). Therefore, a major 
question is whether the discussed survey’s sample is representative of the borrower population.4 
According to Zinman (2009), a sample of 17940 persons was randomly drawn from all 
Oregonians and Washingtonians who took a PL from one of four large companies. Out of this 
sample, the survey firm obtained complete pre-Cap interviews from only 1040 borrowers - 7% of 
the Oregon sample and 5% of the Washington sample. This is a rather small proportion. The 
author does not clarify whether this second selection was random too. Since the 1040 responders 
were split into precisely 520 from each state, it is quite likely that surveyors stopped upon 
reaching a specific quota – and so, respondents may come from a sub-population which was 
easier to contact. There are additional reasons why the social and financial traits of responders 
and non-responders may be quite different. This is known in general as non-response bias; it is 
a problem that plagues survey research to varying degrees. The non-response bias of the pre-
survey sample is not discussed in the report.  
To see how a bias in the sample can distort inference, let us observe the results of a single survey 
question: whether the borrower was late in paying any bill during the past three months 
(information taken from Zinman’s Table 1). Out of 520 pre-Cap Oregon respondents, 430 (83%) 
responded in the affirmative. If the 520 respondents are a representative sample, then with 
reasonable confidence we can assume that 83% is fairly close to the true proportion of late-bill 
payers among the entire Oregon borrower population of the four participating PL companies. 
However, if the sample is biased, and if we cannot find a reliable way to estimate the bias, then 
all we can do is to calculate the range within which the true proportion lies. Assuming that the 
original Oregon sample had about 7500 borrowers5 s, the true proportion of late-bill payers in the 
initial sample could be anywhere from 6% (430 out of 7500) to 99% (7410 out of 7500) – 
rendering the reported proportion of 83% almost meaningless. 
                                                 
4
 Another major factor distorting survey results is the wording, framing and ordering of questions. We cannot 
examine this issue because the report does not provide the complete survey questionnaire texts. 
5
 This is based on extrapolation from the 7% response rate reported, since the exact information was not given. 
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To make matters worse, 1040 borrowers were not the ultimate sample from which Zinman 
(2009) draws his conclusions. Only 873 of the 1040 (441 in Oregon and 432 in Washington) 
agreed to participate in the follow-up survey. This is yet another source for bias, since agreement 
to follow-up is clearly not a random selection. From among them, the survey firm only 
interviewed 200 Oregonians and 200 Washingtonians – again, hinting at a rigid quota. Zinman 
does not specify whether this last selection of a 400-person sample - only 2.2% of the initial 
random sample - was also random. Moreover, some respondents declined to answer certain 
questions. For example, in answer to the post-survey’s late-bill question, 146 out of 196 
Oregonians (74%) reported having paid bills late at least once over the past three months. But the 
true proportion in the only sample which can be plausibly seen as random – i.e., the original 
sample - could be anywhere from 1.9% (146 of 7500) to 99.3% (7450 of 7500). 
At least one aspect of the final sample selection process was definitely not random: anyone who 
had their phones disconnected during five months between pre- and post-surveys –73 of the 441 
Oregonians (16.6%) and 103 of the 432 Washingtonians (23.8%) – was not contacted (this 
information was taken from Zinman, 2008; the 2009 version omitted it). Since it is plausible that 
these borrowers were on average in a worse situation than those still using a phone line (e.g., 
they were far more likely to have paid a bill late; perhaps even their phone bill), and since their 
proportion in Washington is significantly larger, their elimination from follow-up – though 
perhaps inevitable – should cause an overall bias. This bias would likely make Oregon 
respondents seem worse off in the post-survey (relative to Washington) than they really are.6  
Table 1 below summarizes the sampling stages described here, and my concerns about them. 
Since Zinman (2009) provides rather incomplete information about the sampling process, it is 
possible that he received the sample data from the PLI after the fact, without having been 
involved in survey design and oversight. Indeed, the author’s description of the data source, and 
of his relationship with CCRF (the PLI body that funded the survey), does not rule out this 
possibility. If so, the entire study is automatically placed under serious ethical and practical 
doubts (this point will be discussed at greater length in Section 4).  
Reserving our doubts for the moment, we will (for the remainder of Section 2) still assume that 
the sample is fairly representative of the two states’ borrower populations, and that data integrity 
had been maintained. Even then, the sample size of 400 borrowers, split into two groups, 
interviewed both before and after the Cap (with some questions answered by as few as 330 
                                                 
6
 Zinman (2009) does attempt to address the selection bias in going from the 1040 pre-sample to the 400-person 
post-sample via several weighting scheme. However, his methods seem rather questionable (see Appendix B). 
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respondents) is rather on the small side. Needless to say, almost any result from such a sample 
needs to be described using very careful and qualified language.  
 
Stage Resulting Sample Size Type Concerns and Open Questions 
“All” borrowers from 4 
PL companies 
? Proxy for 
population 
Which companies? What is the 
population size? Were duplicate 
entries managed? 
Initial sample 17940 Random Why the large initial sample, if so few 
were ultimately used? 
Pre-survey sample (June-
July 2007) 
1040 (520 each state) ? How were the 1040 chosen? In any 
case, there is a non-response bias 
Agreed to participate in 
post-survey 
873 (441 OR, 432 WA) Volunteers Non-response bias 
Had same phone line 
working during post-
survey 
697 (368 OR, 329 WA) Socio-
economic 
Attrition 
Selection bias (WA “surviving” 
borrowers are a relatively stronger 
subset) 
Post-survey sample 
(November-December 
2007) 
400 (200 each state) ? Why not interview all 697? How 
were the final 400 chosen? 
Table 1: Summary of the sampling process for the survey as reported by Zinman (2008, 2009).  
2.2 Using Washington as a Control, and the Historical Context 
As stated above, choosing Washington for a surrogate quasi-control is generally plausible. In 
normal times, comparing trends in these two states over a five-month period might be a fairly 
safe affair (within the limitations of an observational study, of course). However, as far as the 
economy is concerned, we are now in anything but “normal times”. Here is what the report has 
to say about the economic background: 
“Oregon and Washington are neighboring states that were on similar economic 
trajectories at the time of the surveys: both states had experienced 4 consecutive 
years of employment growth, and both states forecasted a flattening of 
employment rates for the latter half of 2007 (Oregon Office of Economic Analysis 
2007; Washington Economic and Revenue Forecast Council 2007).” [Zinman, 
2009, pp. 8-9] 
This description depicts a background of economic tranquility and (somewhat dampened) 
prosperity, which is perhaps how the cited state planning bureaus had indeed seen things in early 
2007. But since survey respondents based their answers on real-time experience and not on prior 
economic forecasts by their state governments, let us refresh our knowledge from a mid-2009 
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perspective, and place the study period - the second half of 2007 - in its correct economic and 
historical context.  
These months were in fact an early stage of what is widely seen as the nation’s worst economic 
crisis since the Great Depression. In mid-2007 the housing bubble was already bursting across 
most of the country; financial markets were extremely jittery from July 2007 onwards; and the 
impact upon “Main Street” was already tangible enough that by 2007’s end there was a rare 
agreement between the Bush White House and the Democratic Congress leadership, on the need 
for an economic stimulus package. In fact, it has been determined that by late 2007 the nation 
was already officially in recession. Moreover, there is also a general agreement that the crisis 
was first felt among economically vulnerable populations – i.e., the constituency containing most 
PL borrowers. Therefore, one can safely assume that the economic situation of quite a few of 
Zinman (2009)’s survey respondents was affected by the crisis during the study period. 
Oregon and Washington Jobless Trends, 2003-2008
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Figure 2: Unemployment-rate trends from 2003 through 2008, for Oregon (blue), Washington (green) and 
the entire United States (black). Symbols indicate monthly values, while solid lines are based on moving 
averages of the 3 most recent months. The two red vertical lines indicate the approximate time of Zinman 
(2009)’s pre- and post-surveys. Most data were downloaded from the Federal Bureau of Labor Statistics 
website in November 2008, with updates made until January 2009.    
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Let us examine more closely how Oregon and Washington were related to the national context, 
and to each other, in late 2007. Fig. 2 presents the same key measure mentioned in the quoted 
passage above: state jobless rates from 2003 through 2008. The pre- and post-survey dates are 
indicated with two vertical red lines. As can be seen, both Oregon (blue) and Washington (green) 
suffered badly from the dot.com-9/11 economic crisis: unemployment in both was higher than 
the national average (black). Subsequently both states were late in riding the housing bubble, and 
late in its bursting. Eventually, they have caught up with the nation in falling into the present 
recession. 
However, there the similarities end. Oregon’s post-9/11 recession, in terms of jobless rate, was a 
full percentage point worse than Washington’s – even though the two were nearly even with 
~5% unemployment during the year 2000. More directly relevant to our study, Oregon’s 
housing-bubble-related job growth was far less enduring than Washington’s. From spring 2007 
onward, Oregon’s unemployment rate has been getting progressively worse in tandem with the 
national trend. In contrast, throughout 2007 Washington was defying the trend and enjoying an 
economic “Indian Summer” of sorts. 
Why the Oregon and Washington trajectories differed during the study period is an open 
question. Perhaps the impact of Oregon’s most populous neighbor – California, where the 
housing bubble and its burst were quite dominant – was felt upon Oregon suppliers and 
contractors. Or perhaps it is some inherent weakness and vulnerability in Oregon’s economy, 
evident from its unemployment trend throughout the present decade (as of June 2009, Oregon 
unemployment was 12.1% - among the highest in the nation and nearly 3% worse than 
Washington’s).  
The precise answer is immaterial to our discussion. All we need to do here is examine whether 
Washington can be used as a reasonable quasi-control for general economic measures over the 
study period; the answer to this question is no. In other words, given recent economic history 
and the Oregon and Washington trends, it is preposterous to blame any relative weaknesses in 
the Oregon sample’s general economic variables upon the Cap. Yet this is precisely what 
Zinman (2009) presents as the main piece of evidence for Oregon borrowers being “worse off”. 
2.3 Analyzing Survey Results 
a. Results 
The discussion above is summarized in Fig. 3. At this point, it already seems that the report’s 
original causal conclusion rests upon very weak foundations. Yet, the question remains whether 
the 200 Oregonians in the sample were indeed worse off  than the 200 Washingtonians, as 
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Zinman (2009) claims. Data with potential answers to this question are presented in Zinman 
(2008)’s Tables 2 and 3 (the 2009 report had some items dropped; see below). The line items in 
these tables can be roughly divided into three types of personal economic activity: 1. short-term 
loan usage patterns, 2. general economic condition (including employment status), and 3. ability 
to meet ongoing financial obligations. Short-term loan usage patterns, while interesting, are not 
in themselves a direct indicator of being better or worse off – which is Zinman (2009)’s main 
claimed result. In fact, as argued in the introduction, decreasing borrowers’ reliance upon high-
cost loans has been seen as a desirable result by Oregon’s policymakers. 
Less PL-type 
Borrowing in 
Oregon
Observed 
Differences in 
Financial 
Condition b/t
OR, WA 
samples
OR, WA samples 
are small (200 
each); include 
multiple potential 
bias sources
Economic Crisis 
Begins; Oregon 
hit worse than 
WA in 2007
?
 
Figure 3: Potential causes to the financial condition of borrowers in the Oregon sample (relative to 
Washington), in light of my analysis in Section 2.1.  
As to overall economic conditions, given the national and regional background just discussed, 
such measures - on which the Oregon sample fared mildly worse in general - mean little to our 
bottom line. They are related to the recession, first and foremost.  
The most relevant group of questions, therefore, is the third and last one, namely: how well did 
borrowers in the sample handle specific ongoing financial obligations in late 2007, compared 
with mid-2007. I counted five questions in the third group, and my re-analysis for them using 
Chi-Square tests based on relative-risk analysis is presented in Table 2.7 A relative-risk greater 
                                                 
7
 This measure differs somewhat from the “difference in differences” measure used by Zinman (2009); explanations 
why this approach is preferable are found in Appendix A. Regarding the choice of 5 relevant questions out of the 18 
presented by Zinman (2008): in order to enable readers to evaluate my judgment on that matter, all remaining 
questions in the survey are listed on Table C1 in Appendix C. 
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than 1 between Oregon and Washington indicates that the Oregon sample fared worse. The 
corrected p-value conveys the relative strength of the evidence. 
In general, results are similar to Zinman’s raw analysis (Zinman, 2008, Column 5 of Table 2). 
On most variables there is no significant difference between the two samples. The only 
significant signal (question C4, in bold) is in Oregonians’ favor: the number of Oregonians 
paying bills late at least once over the 3 months prior to survey dropped significantly (from 168 
to 146, out of 196), while the corresponding Washington number remained nearly flat (from 149 
to 150, out of 197; exact counts were reconstructed from Zinman’s table). This translates to a 
14% lower adjusted relative risk for the Oregon sample, with a p-value of 0.04, corrected for 
multiple comparisons (see further below). Interestingly, between Zinman (2008) and Zinman 
(2009) seven questions were dropped from his Table 2, including this one. 
Variable Relative Risk 
(OR vs. WA) 
Chi-Square 
Statistic 
Raw P-value Corrected P-
value 
C1: Not having an Account Protection* 0.96 0.11 0.74 0.93 
C2: Overdraft/Bounce at least Once 1.03 0.09 0.76 0.76 
C3: Overdraft/Bounce Twice or More 1.13 0.60 0.44 0.82 
C4: Late Bill at least Once 0.86 6.91 0.009 0.04 
C5: Late Bill "Frequently" 0.86 0.61 0.44 0.90 
Table 2: The five line items from Zinman (2008)’s Table 2 which are directly related to borrowers’ 
financial health, re-analyzed using the Chi-Square test. The first item was changed from “having an account 
protection” to “not having an account protection”, in order to align its direction with the others (i.e., more 
means Oregon faring worse). The p-value correction (rightmost column) accounts for looking at five 
questions, none of which was pre-determined to be of more interest than any other.  
An additional key measure related to handling financial obligations was discussed in Zinman 
(2008, p. 13-14), and mentioned above in Section 2.1: the rate of phone disconnects. Of the 873 
respondents agreeing to participate in the follow-up, 16.6% of Oregonians and 23.8% of 
Washingtonians had their line disconnected during the study period’s five months. This 
difference is clearly significant in Oregon’s favor (Chi-Square statistic: 6.73, p-value: 0.009). 
Moreover, since this information is not subject to the last sample selection stage and is based on 
a sample of 873 borrowers rather than only 400, it is arguably more representative of the general 
borrower population than the data in Table 2. The entire passage containing this information was 
edited out of Zinman (2009).  
b. Methodological Concerns 
The author fails to guard against the fallacy of multiple comparisons: suppose for the moment 
that we made the survey on two groups of robots programmed to give completely random 
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answers. From basic probability theory we know that even with such essentially meaningless 
noise, the chance of yielding a faux  “significant difference” between the groups on at least one 
question – any question - would increase as the number of questions increases. Conversely, 
increasing the number of questions, coupled with a willingness to accept any signal that comes 
our way without taking care of multiple comparisons, will turn any study into little more than a 
“fishing expedition”. Standard approaches to correct for multiple comparisons are roughly 
equivalent to multiplying the p-value. Thus, with 20 questions, each single p-value would be 
multiplied by a factor of up to 20 (see e.g. Miller, 1981). 
Not only does the report ignore multiple comparisons; the author also combines several original 
survey questions to create new comparisons, thus engaging even more aggressively in a “fishing 
expedition”. Consider for example the measure presented as key evidence that Oregonians have 
fared worse (see, e.g., the passage quoted in my p. 2). This measure (last line item of Zinman 
(2009)’s Table 3 and my Table C1, Appendix C) examines whether respondents were 
unemployed, or partially employed, or saw their financial situation deteriorate recently, or 
expect it to deteriorate in the future. This item exhibits three fatal flaws: it is strongly recession-
related, it represents little that makes sense or that can be plausibly attributed to the Oregon Cap 
– and last but not least, its significance is inflated by not correcting for multiple comparisons.  
Finally, the author attempts various ways of re-weighting the sample via propensity scores – and 
then treats these processed versions more seriously than the raw-data version. Absent solid 
information to the contrary, the most reliable snapshot is provided by raw sample responses. In 
our case, reliability is severely limited given the small sample and the questionable sampling 
process, as discussed above in Section 2.1. Propensity scores are a speculative way to fix these 
problems. The scores themselves are estimates, and therefore subject to uncertainty; an 
uncertainty neglected by in the report.  
More fundamentally, key theoretical assumptions for using propensity scores are grossly violated 
in this dataset, thus adding more doubts and biases rather than resolve existing ones. In 
particular, the assumption that sample attrition is unrelated to the effects of interest is clearly 
violated – since attrition by losing one’s phone service is probably related to financial condition 
(Zinman, 2009, footnote 25, p. 9).8  
 
                                                 
8
 A more detailed discussion of Zinman (2009)’s propensity-score approach is found in Appendix B. 
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3. What “Restricted” the “Access”? 
Even though by now the report’s main claim is thoroughly debunked, for reasons that will 
become apparent soon I would like to revisit the first leg of the claimed causal connection– 
namely, Oregon’s post-Cap drop in PL borrowing (recall Fig. 1). Let us assume, as before, that 
the sample is sufficiently representative; then the survey does indeed indicate that there was such 
a reduction. Only about half of the Oregon pre-sample reported recent PL borrowing in the post-
sample, compared with 79% of the Washington sample; this is a strongly significant signal by 
any measure.  
According to Zinman (2009), the direct cause for the contraction of PL business in Oregon is not 
the Cap itself, but rather the sudden supply destruction caused by payday-lender exodus – first 
and foremost, the exit of large national corporations with dozens of statewide branches each: 
Ex-ante, these [i.e., the Cap – AO] were plausibly binding restrictions on payday 
lenders that typically charged at least $15 per $100 for two-week loans pre-Cap, 
since there does not seem to be any compelling evidence that payday lenders 
make excess profits (Flannery and Samolyk 2005; Skiba and Tobacman 2007). 
Fixed costs, loan losses, and related risks can account for market rates of 390% 
APR. Ex-post, the binding nature of the Cap is evidenced by payday lenders 
exiting Oregon.” [Zinman, 2009, p. 6] 
Zinman (2009)’s complete causal explanation why Oregon borrowers are “doing worse”, based 
on this and previously-quoted passages, is illustrated in Fig. 4. It focuses on the supply 
destruction as the sole cause for reduction in PL borrowing. However, during the three months 
before the post-survey, there were well over 100 PL shops in Oregon: substantially less than 
before, but still quite available. In metropolitan Portland’s poor neighborhoods, for example, the 
decrease in PL shops might boil down to extending the trip to the nearest shop from half a mile 
to a mile (roughly speaking, a reduction by a factor of 4 increases distances between neighboring 
shops by a factor of 2). In view of this – given that PL price was dramatically lowered by the 
Cap – why wouldn’t borrowers be just as willing to make that trip? If the product was so good 
for them, why didn’t they crowd the remaining stores now that it is even cheaper? 9 A complete 
answer to this question requires knowledge I do not possess.10 My educated guess, in view of the 
short five-month time frame, is that the drop in PL borrowing reported in the survey may simply 
reflect initial confusion from the sudden disappearance of most PL outlets. 
                                                 
9
 The author does mention this paradox (Zinman, 2009, p.14), but does not follow through on it to revisit his own 
assumptions. 
10
 Some of this information could have been easily available, had the PLI survey presented by Zinman (2009) cared 
to ask questions such as “why didn’t you take a PL recently?” 
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Figure 4: The causal link between the Cap and decrease in PL-type borrowing in Oregon, according to 
Zinman (2009), in greater detail than shown in Fig. 1.  
Here are a few more alternative explanations. First, it is not outlandish to assume, in view of the 
increased local media attention to the issue, that public perceptions of PLs had become more 
negative in Oregon during 2006-2007. Therefore, many Oregonians have perhaps become more 
reluctant to stigmatize themselves as PL borrowers, or unwilling to risk falling into what the 
majority of Oregon’s policymakers saw as a debt trap. Another possible cause for decreased 
borrowing is that social organizations – the same ones who lobbied to pass the Cap law – 
engaged in more extensive outreach efforts to would-be PL borrowers, helping them find lower-
cost substitutes. Again, these are informed speculations rather than definitive answers. But it is 
Zinman’s report – supposedly an academic study - that should have included a wealth of such 
speculations, and a proper survey questionnaire should have included questions examining them.  
Moreover, Zinman (2009) completely ignores payday lenders’ free choice. According to him, 
lenders are either automatons or natural phenomena: once the Cap was enacted, it was inevitable 
that they leave the state because business became impossible. What Zinman’s argument really 
boils down to, is taking the PLI at its word that it is not as profitable as one might think.  
However, the author himself admits in his introduction that the PL profitability debate is far from 
settled. My humble, non-economist view is that the proof is in the pudding: an industry does not 
become a boom market boasting 20% annual growth for an entire decade – unless it is very 
profitable indeed. Furthermore, across the nation, even after this phenomenal growth and 
overcrowding of PL shops, most PLs are still made at the maximum allowed APRs. These two 
pieces of evidence indicate that the PLI operates quite far above its lower profitability bound. 
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Furthermore, they suggest that the PLI’s primary negotiation over rates is not with its customer 
base but with politicians and regulatory agencies.11 
Continuing this line of thought, it is rather plausible that most PL companies – especially the 
deep-pocketed national corporations that were actually the first to fold – could have stayed, tried 
to adapt their Oregon business and continue making money from it, rather than shut it down so 
quickly. But why should a national corporation stay in hostile, Capped Oregon, when next door 
in California or Washington, and elsewhere, it can still take advantage of higher rates and a more 
favorable political climate? In short, a far more likely explanation for the PLI’s exit than the one 
given in the report, is that Oregon is simply paying the price of being first. Taking this 
explanation a bit farther, some of these companies may have made the calculation that making 
the Oregon exit as sudden, painful and widely publicized as possible may pay off in the longer 
term, as a deterrent to other states from following Oregon’s example.  
In summary: the report’s author repeats the PLI’s version of events almost word for word, and 
fails to explore alternative explanations. It is worth noting that the PLI survey apparently did not 
bother to ask borrowers who stopped taking PLs, why they did so. In view of the complex web of 
possible causes illustrated in Fig. 5, such information would have been quite valuable. 
Less PL-type 
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Oregon
Oregon Lowers 
PL Interest Cap
National PL 
Companies find it more 
profitable to relocate to 
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Oregon; remaining lenders 
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The PLI decides to 
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out of Oregon
Oregonians 
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Initial 
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Figure 5: Similar to Fig. 4, only here the causal chains are the ones suggested by my analysis and by an 
online media search. The more plausible links per my judgment are marked by solid lines. 
                                                 
11
 The PLI is certainly not at fault for the huge growth of this captive credit-constrained population – but just like the 
rest of the greater PL debate, this question is tangential to the report discussed here. 
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4. Conclusions and Recommendations 
I reiterate that the conclusions put forth by Zinman (2009) are utterly baseless, for the following 
major reasons: 
1. The article draws its information from a single survey, which is not nearly enough material to 
proclaim any causal connection, surely not in the strong language used by the author. 
Furthermore, this survey was not a controlled experiment. 
2. The survey’s sampling process was tortuous, and several critical sampling stages in this 
process are not properly explained. Those stages which are explained give rise to multiple 
sources of bias, making the sample probably not representative of borrower population. 
Moreover, the final sample – 200 Oregonians and 200 Washingtonians – is quite small. 
3. The study period – five months from mid-2007 to late 2007 – occurred during the slide into 
the current recession, which is a strong source of confounding signals for any economic study. 
The author ignores the economic crisis altogether. 
4. Oregon’s economy has suffered from the economic crisis earlier and more severely than 
Washington – and this difference was already apparent during the study period. Thus, “pre vs. 
post” comparisons on general economic measures of the Oregon sample should generally look 
worse than similar comparisons on Washington sample – without any need to invoke other 
causes such as the Oregon Cap. The only “significant” difference pointing against the Oregon 
sample was found on a combination of general economic measures. 
5. The only two relevant, specific and significant signals regarding personal financial condition 
coming from the survey – on-time bill payment and the ability to retain phone service – 
actually point in favor of the Oregon sample.  
6. The methods used for calculating differences and their significance are severely flawed; for 
example, the effect of multiple hypothesis testing has been completely neglected. 
7. The causal chain argued in the report – the Cap leading to lender exit, leading to less PLs 
taken, leading to economic effects – is far from being the only plausible explanation for the 
chain of events. In fact, it is not very plausible, and more likely explanations exist. The author 
fails to explore them. 
8. There is a suspicious similarity between the terminology, arguments and warnings of PLI 
executives following the Cap’s enactment, and the terminology, arguments and conclusions of 
the report. 
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Even if one accepts the report’s propensity-score modified versions of the data rather than the 
raw results, and even if one is willing to recognize the “unemployed or partially employed or 
had a rough half-year or fearful of the future” combination as a Cap-relevant indicator (and 
again, there is no reason to accept either) – it still means that out of about a dozen indicators of 
financial condition, only one or two point against the Oregon sample and the rest are 
indeterminate. Yet this incredibly weak signal, produced thanks to immense efforts of selective 
logic and creative arithmetic, is rhetorically used by the author as a causal proof beyond doubt 
that the Cap made Oregon borrowers worse off. This is very poor scholarship.  
Given the report’s funding source, one issue which should inevitably be examined is the role of 
industry-sponsored research. Industry-sponsored research has already tainted much of the 
medical sciences, to such a degree that the editors of the Journal of the American Medical 
Association (JAMA) wrote an editorial in Spring 2008 with the strongly worded title “Impugning 
the Integrity of Medical Science: The Adverse Effects of Industry Influence” (DeAngelis and 
Fontanarosa, 2008). This editorial ended with a list of 11 new requirements for medical articles 
published in JAMA, on top of previous restrictions – all designed to neutralize industry influence 
upon the way studies are analyzed and reported. Or course, medical research is far more tightly 
monitored than economics, in terms of analysis methods and standards; but even there, once 
industry money and influence are allowed to dominate independent research, the truth is harmed 
and the public interest ill-served. 
The JAMA editorial paid special attention to the phenomenon of “ghost writers”: industry 
employees or contractors who actually draft the initial article, but are not credited as authors of 
the final manuscript, and sometimes not even mentioned in the acknowledgments. I trust Dr. 
Zinman that he is indeed the text’s sole author, as he declares in footnote 6. However, it is not 
completely clear who designed the survey. We know that the survey was paid for by the PLI; 
were there also “ghost surveyors” from the industry who actually designed the survey and 
decided what would be asked and how, what questions to leave unasked, and (possibly) what 
data to censor out after the fact? The lack of complete documentation and explanation of all the 
survey’s sample-reduction steps points towards this explanation. If so, then the “ghost surveyors” 
should be included as co-authors of the report, since a survey’s design and questionnaire play a 
critical role in any conclusion drawn from it.  
I also object to the use of certain partisan terms in a way that lends them undue academic 
credibility. The report substitutes the term “market rates” for maximum regulatory rates (see 
Section 3 above); this is factually wrong. The author also describes the Cap as “access 
restriction“ – a term appearing with minor variations in the article’s title, four times in its 
abstract and at least ten times in the text. Of course, the Cap, whatever its effect, was not an 
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access restriction. Oregon consumers are still free to go to any PL store offering these loans; the 
restrictions were on providers’ fees and not on anybody’s access. Arguably, the Cap is an access 
expansion for consumers, since reducing the maximum rate makes PLs more affordable. The 
term “access restriction” attaches a negative, totalitarian connotation to the Cap. It is no surprise 
that PLI executives would use it; academic researchers should use more factual terms. 
In terms of research, what the PL field needs are more studies by truly independent academics, 
using independent and impartial (or public-interest) funding sources. It is lamentable that so few 
such researchers have found the issue interesting enough to pursue. There are many deeper 
questions about PL economics – for example, what market model would adequately describe 
their dynamics; or what are the underlying processes contributing to their booming success, and 
whether these processes point to social and economic problems that need to be addressed using 
other means. These questions remain largely unexplored save for partisan studies by industry-
related or consumer-advocacy groups, or studies using woefully inadequate economic models 
that have been thoroughly debunked by the current crisis. As we have so recently learned, 
leaving “the hidden economy of the poor” to fester in the dark - or to be prodded only by those 
profiting heavily from it and by their allies - is a losing strategy. 
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Appendices 
A. “Difference in Differences” vs. Relative Risk 
Zinman’s approach to analyze survey responses was what he calls “difference-in-differences” 
(DD), which is simply 
DD= ( )beforeafterbeforeafter pppppp WA,WA,OR,OR,WAOR −−−=∆−∆ , 
with the p’s indicating observed proportions of “yes” responses to a given survey question. This 
method is most suitable for variables that are not restricted, i.e. they can take any value. 
However, proportions are restricted between 0 and 1 (or, equivalently, between 0% and 100%), 
creating potential distortions. For example, quite often we would not view a change from 1% to 
6% the same way as a change from 45% to 50%; the former is arguably more drastic. However, 
the DD approach treats them as equal. Sometimes this is appropriate; sometimes not, depending 
upon the research context. Moreover, the normal approximation justifying the p-values reported 
for DD calculations begins to break down when the number of observed “yes” or “no” responses 
is only in the single digits. This does occur in several questions, most prominently in the question 
whether responders find it hard to get short-term loans (last line-item in Zinman’s Table 2; item 
A7 in my Table C1, Appendix C). In Washington’s pre-survey, only 8 respondents answered 
“yes” - rendering the DD significance calculations overly optimistic.  
An arguably safer standard approach to “yes-no” type survey data is a Chi-Square test of 
homogeneous association on the three-way table generated by the division of responses into OR 
vs. WA and the two sets of “yes” vs. “no” answers to any question (one set before, one set after; 
see e.g. Agresti, 2002, Section 6.3). Zinman does not provide complete data to construct the 
data’s three-way tables, but the details in his Table 2 are sufficient to reconstruct the data 
margins and perform a somewhat simplified version of the Chi-Square test. In order to calculate 
the null distribution for this test, I used the measure of relative risk (Richardson, 2008). Risk 
here is a synonym for probability, so the relative risk (RR) is 
RR=
beforeafter
beforeafter
before
after
before
after
pp
pp
p
p
p
p
RR
RR
OR,WA,
WA,OR,
WA,
WA,
OR,
OR,
WA
OR
== . 
With RR, a doubling in “yes” response rate from 5% to 10% will be equivalent to a doubling 
from 10% to 20% - and much stronger than a 5% increase from 45% to 50%. Both the RR-based 
Chi-Square test and the difference-in-proportion (Zinman’s “DD”) test are acceptable measures 
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under certain limitations. With large enough samples, close enough to a 50%-50% split between 
“yes” and “no”, and when Oregon’s and Washington’s initial rates are similar, the two should 
yield similar results. Otherwise, deciding which test is preferable depends upon the research 
context, and in case of doubt it is a good idea to examine both.12 I found the RR approach to be 
more appropriate, since when the two state samples had different baseline levels it makes more 
sense to compare each state’s proportional change, rather than the absolute change.   
B. Correcting for Sample “Attrition” 
Zinman (2008,2009) does not stop his analysis with simple calculations based on the raw data 
from 400 respondents. Rather, he re-analyzes the data three times – in all cases, producing 
conclusions somewhat more favorable to the PLI’s cause (i.e., showing Oregonians as worse off 
in the post-survey). For example, the late-bill rate signal, significant in Oregon’s favor in the raw 
sample, becomes insignificant after the author assigns each respondents a weight designed to 
make the sample of 200 in each state more “representative” of the original sample, or to make 
the Washington sample demographically more “similar” to the Oregon sample, using propensity-
score weighting (columns 6 and 7, respectively, of the report’s Tables 2-4). A key assumption in 
the weighting schemes is that the difference between the 200 respondents and the remaining 320 
in each state sample, is not related to financial outcome (Zinman 2009 footnote 25, p. 9) – an 
assumption clearly violated here (see above, Section 2.1).  
There are additional reasons not to prefer a re-weighted analysis over the raw one. First, the 
sample is too small to support such manipulations with high confidence. Second, there are no 
off-the-shelf standard methods yet for such re-weighting, and therefore the door is open to keep 
tweaking weights until the desired signal is obtained. Finally, given the sample selection process 
and the nature of the questions, there is no safe and reliable way to “salvage” a larger and more 
representative picture using the smaller sample’s data. Specifically, the group of 640 borrowers 
(320 in each state) excluded from the post-sample is in fact a collection of three groups with 
different characteristics:  
1. Those who refused to participate in the post-survey (79 in Oregon, 88 in Washington) – a 
source of non-response bias; 
2. Those (from among the remaining group) who had lost their phone line during the study 
period (73 in Oregon, 103 in Washington) – a source of economically-related bias; 
                                                 
12
 With both methods, the test needs to be modified in case all responses are “yes” or “no. 
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3. From the remaining group, a quota excluded to yield exactly 200 from each state (168 in 
Oregon, 129 in Washington) – no bias if this last exclusion was random (if it was not 
random, then the entire survey and its analysis are worthless). 
In light of this, it would have been far better to try and interview all 697 respondents who agreed 
to a post-survey and still had a working phone line, and thus eliminate the last of the three 
groups. It would have also been worthwhile to try and locate the ones who have lost (or changed) 
their phone service – and thus minimize the size of the second group, which is the most liable to 
cause outcome-related bias. In any case, assuming the final 200-person quota selection stage was 
random, the third (and largest) group should be equivalent to the post-sample. But Zinman 
(2009)’s propensity-score weighting does not consider this three-group structure; rather, it lumps 
all three together – while any conscientious attempt to use propensity scores should have 
modeled each group separately.  
C. Table of Other Survey Questions 
Variable Zinman’s Analysis Comments 
A1: Took a Payday loan Less in Oregon Agreed; but this is not a relevant indication of 
financial health 
A2: Took an Auto-Title loan No Signal Not a relevant indicator 
A3: Took a Credit-Card Cash Advance No Signal Not a relevant indicator 
A4-6: Various combinations of A1-3 
and C2-5 
Less in Oregon Combinations that mean little; signal is 
dominated by PL-taking gap 
A7: Harder to get Short-Term Loans? More in Oregon Signal much weaker when using standard Chi-
Square approach (p=0.10 before correction), and 
when using multiple-testing correction. Also 
quite possibly affected by economic crisis.  
B1: Unemployed No significant signal Hardly related to the question of interest (effects 
of the Cap); recession-affected. 
B2: Unemployed/Partially-employed No significant signal Hardly related to the question of interest (effects 
of the Cap); recession-affected. 
B3: Financial situation worse? No significant signal Subjective and vague; recession-affected. 
B4: Future financial outlook worse? Oregon weakly more 
(significant at 10% 
level, uncorrected) 
Subjective and vague; no multiple-comparison 
correction; recession-affected. 
B5: Yes to any of B1+B4 More in Oregon Combination meaningless and not called for; 
responses strongly recession-affected; corrected 
p-value using relative-risk is 0.12. 
Table C1: All remaining questions from Zinman (2009)’s Tables 2 and 3, which were not included in my 
Table 2. The prefix A indicates questions related to borrowing patterns; B to general economic situation.  
